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Abstract 
Thanks to policies that were put into practice after the 2001 crisis, which constitutes a 
turning point for Turkish economy, fiscal discipline was restored, single digit inflation 
was reached, and yet growth rate was doubled compared to the previous decade average. 
As a result investment climate improved and the economy benefited from substantial 
amount of foreign direct investment and other long-term capital inflows. However these 
developments had some adverse side effects as well. Real appreciation of domestic 
currency, deterioration of trade balance, and increasing private indebtedness generated 
vulnerability for sudden stops. Beside, increasing global integration and very rapid shift 
in the economic circumstances caused difficulties for traditional sectors. This paper 
analyzes the Turkish experience after 2001 and identifies underlying dynamics of the 
restructuring program, while denoting the costs of this transition. Turkish case provides 
evidence in favor of disinflation programs combined with sound fiscal policies in spite of 
some adverse effects in the short run. 
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Introduction 
Structural reforms and stabilization programs are costly and painful everywhere. 
Especially when the shift in the economy is fast, economic units, which have taken 
position according to previous structure’s parameters, suffer significantly in the process 
of adapting to the new system. Consequently the question of whether the restructuring 
should be carried out, as a series of radical reforms and rapid transformation (shock 
therapy) or a more cautious and piecemeal (gradualist) approach needs to be explored. . 
Especially since the dramatic collapse of socialist systems and central planning 
institutions, a voluminous literature has emerged on this issue. This reform literature 
offers two contrasting approaches. The first approach is to launch rapid reforms policies 
and to undertake as many reforms as possible in the shortest possible time. The second 
approach is to conduct reform policies through partial and gradual policy packages. Each 
path offers its own distinctive pattern of risks and rewards to policy makers and societies. 
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Shock therapy model for sure, received some criticism (e.g. Murrel, 1991; McKinnon, 
1991; Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Poirot, 1997; Marangos, 2004a). However, the clear lesson 
of the past reforms and empirical studies reveals that decisive and consistent reform pays 
off (Lipton and Sachs, 1992; Sachs, 1996; Aslund et al., 1996; World Development 
Report, 1996; Popov, 2000; Ahluwalia, 2002). Hence, governments need to embark on a 
critical mass of plans to build credibility and to alter the behavior of households and firms 
resisting against the reforms. Reformers need to move quickly to exploit a narrow 
window of opportunity for successful change given the “fact that reforms do arouse 
opposition, and that the opposition often tends to be strongest early on” (Rodrik, 1996: 
30). 
The term transition economy became a synonym of “ex-communist economy” 
particularly after 1990s. However, there are many economies which have never been 
identified as communist while having certain characteristics resembling the transition 
countries.   In these countries, price mechanisms do not function according to the market 
dynamics.  Governments impose varying degrees of implicit or explicit restrictions not 
only on domestic transactions, prices, and markets but also on external transactions like 
on free exchange of domestic currency or free entry of firms into domestic market. In a 
broader sense, transition literature needs to encompass “transformation” of any economy 
from the position of distorted price mechanism, fiscal indiscipline and high inflation to a 
situation where all prices are determined freely in well-functioning markets. Nevertheless 
to label an economic change as “transformation”, the process should include removal of 
all restrictions preventing efficient allocation of economic resources, elimination of 
inflationary pressure of public sector deficits, rationalization of subsidies, privatization of 
state economic activity, assurance of the independent monetary policy, and hence moving 
towards a free trade, free enterprise, free market economy. 
In Turkey, public sector has constituted a considerable weight and the government has 
played a influential role in economic activity since 1930s. After an initial period of 
relatively liberal “laissez-faire” policies, “Etatism” was adopted as one of the basic 
principles of the constitution (Krueger, 1987: 4). Nationalization of railways, ports, 
infrastructure and foundation of more than forty State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were 
all clear indications of this trend. Under a highly protected policy of import substitution, 
controls imposed on foreign trade and payments regime as a reaction to growing short-
term indebtedness and increasing current account deficits, created a mélange of multiple 
exchange rates with various parities for each category of import and export, import 
licensing, tariffs, quotas, and other regulations (Krueger, 1974: 8; Krueger, 1987: 20). 
The first serious crisis of Turkish economy in post World War II period was characterized 
by 1958 devaluation of Turkish lira against US dollar from 2.80 to 9.00 under the 
pressure of increasing inflation, import shortages, retarded economic growth, a 
flourishing black market, and continuous defaults in foreign debt service (Krueger, 1974: 
65; Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 109). Despite some trouble during 1960s, until the second 
half of 1970s, the situation was still as manageable. Turkey completed the decade with a 
deep crisis and in January 1980, a comprehensive reform package was announced. 
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However, due to the social and political tensions, measures could not have been brought 
to full fruition until the military coup in September 1980. In a less-than-ten year span, the 
economy had achieved an outstanding performance; shortages were resolved, economy 
recovered after the three-year recession, and balance of payment position was improved 
to such a level that the government had the courage of liberalizing both trade and capital 
accounts. However in two main issues the situation was not alike, if not worse. Inflation, 
which had already escalated to a double digit pace about 20s percent beginning from 
1970, jumped to a higher platform of 40s percent. Public sector deficit, which had been 
the main factor behind all economic turbulences, remained around 6 percent of GDP. The 
disappointing end of the decade was an early warning of 1990s where two severe crises 
hit the economy. 
After two-and-a-half decades of high inflation and volatile growth period, frequent 
crashes, and several unsuccessful stabilization attempts, in December 1999, an exchange 
rate based disinflation program supported by the IMF was launched. Initially, the 
stabilization program appeared to succeed in certain aspects. However, the Turkish 
economy later experienced the worst financial crisis of last half-century in the middle of 
the road. The 2001 crisis constitutes a turning point in many ways and has enduring 
consequences. Policies and measures that were put into practice after the 2001 crisis were 
aiming at removing distortions in the Turkish economy, restructuring the financial system 
and changing the dynamics of the economy to achieve price stability, sustainable public 
finances and hence sustainable growth in the long run. In a five-year period public fiscal 
discipline was evidently restored, single digit inflation was reached, and yet growth rate 
was doubled compared to the previous decade average. As a result investment climate in 
Turkey improved and, for the first time the economy benefited from substantial amount 
of foreign direct investment and other long-term capital inflows. 
However above-mentioned developments had some adverse side effects as well. 
Paradoxically, Turkish economy was seized by its success. Real appreciation of domestic 
currency, deterioration of trade balance and increasing private indebtedness generated 
vulnerability for sudden stops. Beside, increasing global integration and very rapid shift 
in the economic circumstances caused difficulties for traditional sectors to reposition 
themselves against the new rules of the game. The aim of this paper is to analyze the 
success story of Turkish economy following the 2001 crisis and to define underlying 
dynamics of the restructuring program, while denoting the costs emerging from this 
transition. The paper argues that the Turkish case provides evidence in favor of 
disinflation programs combined with sound fiscal policies in spite of some adverse effects 
in the short run. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background to 
Turkish economy while explaining comprehensive reform attempts occurred in 1980s. 
The reasons of failure are searched throughout the section as well. Section 3 focuses on 
1990s when the macroeconomic balances and main price mechanisms were destroyed 
completely. Section 4 examines the 1999 stabilization program and its failure. Section 5 
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discusses the ongoing transformation of Turkish economy within a cost and benefit 
framework. Concluding notes are relegated to the last section. 
1. Background: Early Attempts of Transformation During 1980s 
Turkey’s economic performance until mid 1970s may be considered as satisfactory, 
though beginning from late 1950s the economy had occasionally difficulties mainly 
arising from intermittent expansionary fiscal and accommodative monetary policies. 
Especially during 1960s when the distress became more apparent, Turkey had to resort 
regularly to the IMF standby programs. Nevertheless, over two decades, 6.1 percent real 
average growth rate was attained with a standard deviation of 4 percent. Growth 
performance of 6.6 percent on the average had been achieved between 1971 and 1976. 
Later, Turkey found itself in a grave trouble materializing in the form of foreign exchange 
squeeze during second half of 1970s. Meanwhile, political instability due to weak 
coalitions and rising social tension combined with financing difficulties, increased 
country risk of Turkey. Ambition for vote maximization of short-tem governments paved 
the way for large public sector wage increases and higher agricultural price subsidies that 
deteriorated the central budget. In addition, elevated SEE investments financed from the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and from other state banks, and a 
relaxation of the limits on borrowing by the central government from the Central Bank 
caused a monetary loosening. With a resumption of central bank financing and more 
rapid money growth, the pressures on the exchange rate increased constantly despite the 
administrative restrictions that were used to limit demand for foreign exchange and 
repeated devaluations that took US dollar Turkish lira parity step by step from 19.25 in 
1977 to 47.10 in 1979. As the rising tides of the first oil shock were deteriorating 
international economic environment, foreign creditors refused to open new lines or 
rollover existing loans, and Turkish economy, which ran out of foreign reserves fell into a 
severe debt crisis.  
In addition to foreign exchange squeeze, inflation, which had rose to double-digit rates 
earlier in 1971, accelerated further. Unemployment was swelling, even many basic 
consumer goods were in shortage, frequent labor strikes almost totally blocked industrial 
production, and political violence was spreading throughout the country. 
On January 24th 1980 the minority government, which had come to power only two 
months before, announced a comprehensive stabilization package designed by Turgut 
Özal, then undersecretary to the prime minister. The economic program included a very 
high devaluation of the Turkish lira against US dollar from 47.1 to 70 to eliminate its 
excess overvaluation, remarkable price increases for goods and services produced by the 
SEEs and removal of restrictions on interest rates. Özal was the architect of the program 
and had won confidence of both the international capital due to his experience at the 
World Bank and domestic capital as serving President of Turkish Metal Industrialist 
Union. Hence when the military took over in September 1980, he was appointed vice 
prime minister and minister responsible for economy and finance. Turkey’s main problem 
was diagnosed as foreign exchange shortage. Hence the cure directly targeted at balance 
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of payments. The shift from import substitution regime to an outward oriented model had 
been impossible because of the power of vested interest groups who were benefiting from 
protections and subsidies until 1981. To shift towards export promotion in a country like 
Turkey with a large domestic market required a strong government with a long-term 
horizon and considerable autonomy (Pamuk, 2007: 285). These were exactly the features 
assured in the Turkish political scene in early 1980s. Because of military intervention, 
there were no political and social oppositions. However Özal could not execute his 
project of outward orientation and liberalization in a shock therapy model. Export 
subsidies and a more realistic exchange rate policy favoring exports ameliorated foreign 
balance and the support from international organizations and creditors eased the foreign 
exchange squeeze. The quantitative trade restrictions remained. However, the frictions 
prevented Özal to go faster because many influential people, in and out of government 
were skeptical about this transformation. These combined with revenue and protection 
requirements forcing the government caused import liberalization not to function properly 
given that highly discretionary specific import duties were still effective (Rodrik, 1990: 
4). 
Another immediate need was the reformation of financial system, which was 
characterized during the years before 1980 as highly repressed. The financial repression 
consisted of ceilings on deposit and lending rates and negative real interest rates, credit 
rationing and subsidized credits to priority sectors, excessive taxation of financial 
incomes and transactions, high intermediation costs, widespread connected ownership 
between financial and non-financial corporations, undeveloped capital markets and 
reliance on bank loans for business financing, abuse of Central Bank for public 
expenditures financing, restriction on foreign entry and foreign asset holdings (Akyüz, 
1990: 98). Reform program of January 24th addressed many of these rigidities. However, 
as in the case of trade, financial liberalization also faced some setbacks. The deregulation, 
which lifted interest controls aiming at increasing deposits and financial savings could 
endure only two years before a financial crisis crystallized when large number of 
brokerage houses (so called “bankers”) became insolvent and five private banks were 
declared bankrupt (Atiyas, 1990: 133-134). 
Özal had to resign during the crisis. After a hiatus of 16 months he won the elections and 
became prime minister. He then launched the second round of interrupted reforms in a 
more passionate and ambitious manner. The January 1984 reforms represented a major 
break with the past. Quantitative restrictions on imports were virtually eliminated. Export 
performance in consequence has been impressive. Exports, which stood at only 2.9 billion 
US dollar in 1980, soared to 11.6 billion in 1988. The government’s policy to maintain 
exchange rate on a real depreciation path continued until 1988. After 1988, the CBRT 
slowed down the rate of depreciation of the Lira. A uniform rate regime was established 
which also eliminated the black market. The Central Bank commenced daily adjustment 
of exchange rates (CBRT, 2002). In addition to those significant efforts, rationalization 
and privatization of some of the State Economic Enterprises; liberalization of the credit 
market and banking system, and opening up of the economy were undertaken. Residents 
were permitted to hold foreign currency, foreign exchange deposits and to make 
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payments via foreign exchange. Similarly commercial banks were permitted to hold 
foreign exchange positions, and allowed to fix their exchange rates freely by 1985. Non-
residents were granted to acquire real estate and real rights, invest or conduct business 
activities, purchase shares and engage in partnerships. A new Capital Markets Law was 
accepted in 1985, İstanbul Stock Exchange became operative. At the Same time 
government began to issue treasury bills and bonds to finance the budget deficit. 
Government securities auctions were introduced. The CBRT established Interbank money 
market and foreign exchange market, and started open market operations. Capital account 
liberalization in Turkey was the last step of these reforms, and was fully completed in 
nine years. This period of rapid reforms prevailed until 1989 when Özal lost much 
popular ground and had himself elected president (Önder et al. 128-161, Turhan, 157-
160).  
Despite the enormous change occurred in Turkey between 1980 and 1989, there are 
several criticisms arguing that Turkey’s decision of liberalization and marketization, and 
especially opening capital account was a wholly unnecessary rushed approach and “too 
immature” (Akyüz, 1991; Boratav et al., 1996; Rodrik, 1990; Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 1991; 
Boratav and Yeldan, 2002). However, both timing and speed of reforms were appropriate. 
Indeed, the path of events in Eastern Europe in the following decade verified this 
decision. Turkey had already been transformed in a market economy and was far ahead of 
many emerging markets. Nonetheless all of those criticisms were right in their claims, 
that is visible e.g. in Rodrik, who accurately describes this decade as “incomplete 
stabilization” (Rodrik, 1990). Two very crucial elements were missing in the 1980s 
reforms, namely providing public sector discipline and building a transparent and 
accountable institutional governance framework, which would have assured the 
progression towards an efficient free market economy. On contrary, the scope of 
government activity grew remarkably through extra-budgetary funds, which were often 
abused for discretionary purposes. Under such an environment of loose and 
nontransparent fiscal policy, financial liberalization turned into a harmful factor for 
macroeconomic stability. Because of lack of credibility arising from policy inconsistency, 
despite all attempts and generous incentives towards the private sector to induce more 
“privatization” of the economy, private investments observed to be stagnant and business 
conditions remained sluggish (Yeldan, 1987). The policy makers stuck in patronage-
driven distribution of government benefits, preferred a gradualist and eclectic approach, 
instead of cutting immediately public sector deficit, granting independence to the Central 
Bank, adopting rule-based economic policies. This did not only harm the integrity of 
1980 attempt but also spilled over into 1990s. 
2. Lost Decade of Turkey: 1990s 
After a whole decade of political stability, Turkey was exposed to adverse effects of a 
series of 11 weak governments during 1990s. Economic instability naturally accompanied 
it with an average yearly real growth rate of 3.9 while the standard deviation of growth 
was 5.9, and with an average yearly inflation of 78.7 As a result, the 1990s should be 
considered as the lost decade of Turkey  (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: The Real Growth Rate Between 1991-2007 (GDP, annualized quarterly %) 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 
The relaxed income policies included raise in government’s personnel expenditures to 7.8 
percent of GDP, the delusive obsession of controlling inflation through SEEs pricing, 
which eroded the both SEEs and public banks, irrational transfers to the social security 
institutions and to the agricultural sector. All these resulted in huge public sector deficits, 
that accounted on the average 6.2 percent of GDP during the 1990s (Turhan, 1995: 161; 
Turhan, 2001: 161-162). Consequently, as public indebtedness was escalating, Turkey 
faced with a dilemma regarding the domestic debt and open capital account. Increased 
domestic borrowing requirement implied high interest rates, which in turn led to higher 
interest payment costs and a further widening of the public sector deficits (CBRT, 2002: 
31). Interest payments on domestic debt to GNP ratio rose significantly to 8.4 percent on 
the average during the period between 1992-1999 (Table 1) Not only the interest paid on 
public debt was incredibly high, but also the maturity of domestic debt was very short-
term. High interest rates and short term maturity structure attracted short-term capital 
inflows and paved the way for real appreciation. Besides, the Central Bank played a 
supportive role to accommodate public financing by easing short-term capital inflows 
with its monetary and exchange rate policies. 
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Table 1: Public Sector Balances (Ratio to GNP, annual, %) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Nominal Public Balance -12.4 -13.1 -10.2 -6.4 -13.2 -13.1 -15.9 -24.5 
Net Interest Payments 5.4 7.5 10.0 9.1 11.9 11.0 16.4 20.0 
Of which budgetary 3.7 5.8 7.7 7.3 10.0 7.7 11.5 13.7 
CPI (annual average, %) 70.1 66.1 106.3 93.7 82.3 85.7 84.6 64.9 
Treasury Borrowing Rate a 97.8 90.3 150.6 124.2 132.2 107.4 115.5 104.6 
Depreciation Rate of 
TRL against USD b 64.6 60.5 169.9 53.5 77.9 86.9 71.6 61.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2000), Treasury, and the CBRT 
a : 1992-1994 Treasury bills, three-month or close to maturity realized at Treasury auctions, compounded and weighted 
average. 1995-1999 Treasury auction borrowing rate, compounded and weighted average 
b : Year over year average change in % 
As a result of above mentioned policy mix, inflation rose to triple-digit levels twice. The 
basic elements of disinflation efforts were in various forms of nominal anchoring and 
monetary tightening without any serious measure to reduce public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR), which exceeded its pre-stabilization level and reached 10 percent of 
GDP on the average. Furthermore, central government budget recorded a primary deficit 
equal to 3.9 percent of GDP as of 1994. As a result, domestic interest rates jumped up to 
90 percent and Turkish lira appreciated in real terms offering a wide interest arbitrage 
spread to speculative short-term capital. Appreciation of domestic currency deteriorated 
trade balance and eventually current account deficit rose to 6.4 percent of GDP and 
Turkey found itself in a twin deficit position in mid-1990s (Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001: 6-
7; Özatay, 1996: 21-22). 
The government, aiming at relieving the interest burden in the budget, tried to control the 
interest rates, that is attacked the symptoms of the problem rather than the cause. This 
attempt to lower interest rates on debt in spite of such high levels of PSBR (12.4 in 1993) 
proved to be a very dangerous one. Cancellation of four consecutive auctions in the last 
quarter of 1993 in turn enhanced the uncertainty in the markets, and the demand for T-
Bills disappeared leaving the Treasury with the CBRT short-term advances as its only 
domestic source to finance the budget deficit (Özatay, 1996: 29). The excess liquidity, 
which arose from monetization of debt, immediately transformed into a speculative attack 
on domestic currency. The Central Bank, while trying to keep the interest rates at their 
artificially low levels, attempted to defend the exchange rate by selling foreign currency. 
As a result, the Central Bank lost half of its foreign exchange reserves (Ersel and Sak, 
1995). The turmoil in the markets continued as exchange rates started to rise at an 
unprecedented rate and Turkish lira depreciated by 56.4 percent in four months. 
A stabilization program, later supported by an IMF Standby was launched on April 5th, 
1994. It involved significant cuts in discretionary government spending, immediate price 
increases for SEEs (followed by a six-month freeze), and a tightening of monetary policy. 
During the second quarter of the year, interest rates on three-month treasury securities 
averaged 275 percent (annually), moving for short periods as high as 400 percent. As part 
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of the stability package, the banking regulations on capital adequacy and net total 
position, were tightened compelled the banking sector to adopt international standards, 
and put limits on the management of their liquidity that they had to adopt. As a result 
three affiliated private banks were declared as insolvent and taken out the banking 
system. This fueled a bank run and the government had to give a blanket deposit 
insurance guarantee to all deposits in the banks (Parasız, 2000). As annual inflation rate 
reached at 124 percent in May, and as real wages fell by 15 to 20 percent, private 
consumption and investment declined dramatically. (Celasun, 1998: 19). 
Elevated domestic interest rates convinced investors that first move in foreign exchange 
rate was a typical overshooting and expectations moved towards a much reduced rate of 
nominal depreciation for Turkish lira. Consecutively short-term capital began to flow 
back into the economy by mid-year. Hence international reserves of the central bank were 
rebuilt and monetary expansion began to pick up (Parasız, 1995: 214-217). The central 
bank was forced to an accommodation to ease monetary tightness in order to reduce 
interest rates and the interest payments required on government debt. The tightness of 
stabilization policies was relaxed by autumn (Civcir, 2003: 515). The inflation rate, which 
had started to decline regained momentum and inflation began to fluctuate around 80 
percent as of the second half of 1995. Until 1998, no serious stabilization efforts were 
undertaken and the economy fell into an instability trap, with average Treasury auction 
rate for the period 1995-1997 was 121.2 percent, and annual inflation rate was 85 percent. 
The malign effects of such an unstable macroeconomic environment spread over political 
and social structure of Turkey and caused economic units to adapt themselves 
accordingly and to learn to live with high inflation. Backward indexation became 
common in pricing behaviour and inflation entered a self-fulfilling cycle. Recurrent 
foreign exchange shortages prior to 1980 and the crisis of 1994 left an important mark on 
Turkey’s collective memory that caused an exaggerated obsession of Turkish citizens on 
current account deficits (Akat, 2000: 269, Turhan, 2001: 155-156). Combined with the 
endured persistent inflation, this led a high degree of currency substitution resembling 
situation in similar countries (Chang and Velasco, 2002; Reinhart et al., 2003, Civcir, 
2003). Dollarization of both assets and liabilities did not only damage efficient allocation 
of resources, as savers put most of their savings into unproductive areas, but also 
dramatically increased the vulnerability of the economy to exogenous shocks through 
deterioration of balance-sheets (Mishkin, 2001; Turhan, 2001). Unfavorable impact of 
this unstable economic environment has been also felt in the labor market and prevented 
it from functioning effectively. Economic growth within continuous boom-boost cycles 
led volatility to labor force. Especially unskilled workers were the first ones to lose their 
jobs in periods of contraction and the last ones that were employed in expansion periods. 
While Turkey ranked low in fields such as infrastructure, education, health and the fair 
distribution of income in international development indicators, it ranked 64th out of 102 
countries in indices of corruption (Hodess, 2003). Chronic inflation also obscured price 
and quality consciousness of consumers. Similarly producers were less concerned with 
cost efficiency, and were willing to determine profit margins freely. As a result of 
missing efficiency and productivity stimuli, Turkish industry lost its competitive power.  
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Banking sector was influenced badly from the effects of economic instability during 
1990s. Besides being exposed to all detrimental consequences of abovementioned 
atmosphere, because of high inflation and extremely volatile market conditions, banks 
had to bear huge amounts of unhedgeable financial risks. Since financing the public 
sector deficits with high real interest rates was an easy way to generate profits, bank did 
not pay attention to basic principles of risk management, such as currency and maturity 
mismatches. Some banks also gave huge amounts of connected loans. In addition, 
Treasury’s blanket deposit insurance guarantee without an effective supervision was 
creating a serious moral hazard since depositors did not differentiate between the risky 
banks and the sound ones (Turhan, 2001:164-168). Banks, except engaging in connected 
lending were unable and unwilling to fulfill their intermediary functions effectively. This 
resulted mainly from the fact that the banks were the principal fund-raisers to finance 
public deficits. Elevated ratio of public deficits and debt stock to national income caused 
a financial crowding-out (Turhan, 1995: 173). While prevailed uncertainty was eroding 
term structure of financial contracts and induced myopic behaviour, the average maturity 
of domestic borrowing was only 8.4 months over the period 1995-1998. This led to a an 
even worsening of public debt, acceleration of currency substitution and almost complete 
dependence of the banking system on arbitrage margins offered by high rates on 
government debt in comparison with international borrowing and domestic deposits, 
including foreign exchange deposits, at the cost of large currency risks (Table 1). 
Government was increasingly engaged in Ponzi financing whereby rising interest 
payments could only be met by issuing new debt (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003:1551). 
In 1998 a newly established three-party coalition government launched a comprehensive 
disinflation program, known as Staff Monitored Program (SMP), with the aim of 
reducing inflation and improving the fiscal performance of the country. Central Bank 
lending to the Treasury was ceased and consequently, the inflation began to fall. 
However, five months later the government collapsed after losing a no-confidence motion 
over corruption allegations including Prime Minister’s tampering with the sale of a state 
bank. The political uncertainties and the earthquakes in August and November 1999 
impeded the program to obtain the expected results. Eight banks whose deposits 
accounted 10.7 percent of the banking system taken-over by the Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund. Moreover, contagion effect of the Asian and the Russian crises beset the 
already vulnerable economy and in the last quarter of 1998, after a fourteen-quarter 
period Turkey entered into a recession again (Turhan, 2001: 171). 
3. 1999 Program and 2000-2001 Crises 
The government formed after the April 1999 elections adopted an exchange rate based 
disinflation program (ERBSP), which included a fiscal adjustment, structural reforms, 
and a firm exchange rate commitment supported by consistent incomes policies in 
December 1999. Its target was to bring down the CPI and WPI to 25% and 20%, 
respectively by the end of 2000, and to the single digit level by the end of 2002. As the 
program brought a limit on the Central Bank’s net domestic assets, and it was committed 
not to engage in sterilization, hence macroeconomic equilibrium was to be attained 
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mainly through changes in interest rates. Fiscal goal involved raising the primary surplus 
of the public sector (which included the consolidated central budget, the extra-budgetary 
funds, the local government, the non-financial SEEs, the central bank, and the so-called 
duty losses of state banks) from 2.8 percent of GNP in 1999 to 3.7 percent of GNP in 
2000. Structural reforms were categorized as reforming agricultural subsidies system, 
restructuring of pension system, enhancing transparency and accountability in public 
finance, accelerating privatizations, and strengthening the banking system and banking 
regulation (IMF, 1999; Turhan, 2001: 181). An independent banking authority the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) had already become operational a 
few months earlier. This was defined as one of the pro-loaded performance criteria of the 
program. Existence of several studies providing evidence that countries, which adopted 
some form of fixed exchange rate regime in their stabilization packages were more 
successful to curb inflation, to decrease interest rates and to induce fiscal discipline was 
legitimizing in such a decision. Moreover, countries that adopted exchange rate based 
stabilization programs seemed to have experienced faster output recovery than countries 
that pursued money based stabilization programs. In addition, as already mentioned, 
foreign exchange denominated or indexed contracts, pricing and saving behaviors became 
widespread as a part of hedging mechanism of economic units against chronic inflation, 
given the level of dollarization. Hence, it was very difficult to bring the inflation down 
without stabilizing the foreign exchange rate (Calvo and Végh, 1994; Turhan, 2001: 213, 
238). 
First, as was the case with many other ERBSPs, external borrowing by the banks and the 
private sector increased depending on large short term capital inflows, while foreign 
direct investment remained negligible. Since the central bank did not engage in any 
sterilization efforts, money market liquidity increased and interest rates fell. Among other 
things, this eased the debt burden of the government, and caused the default risk to 
decrease, encouraging even more capital inflows (Ghosal, 2006: 181). These 
developments paved the way to moral hazard problem, since pegged exchange rate was 
assuring implicit guarantees for those borrowing in foreign currency, i.e. a public 
insurance against exchange rate risk to the private sector. This situation attracted capital 
inflows further, but left the economy very vulnerable to external shocks. The sharp rise in 
capital flows, in turn, increased the supply of loanable funds and caused to a lending 
boom and concurrently a sharp decline in the quality of banks’ assets. Rapid increase in 
nonperforming loans of the banks, worsening currency and maturity mismatches, weak 
capital structure combined with the delays in banking reform, prepared ground for a 
banking crisis. Despite the fact that both the private and state banks had accumulated 
risks on the road to the crisis, the nature of the problem was different. On the asset side, 
the increasing size of “duty loss” accumulation of the state banks and the need to finance 
it by short-term domestic bank liabilities were the source of the problem (Turhan, 2001: 
172; Özatay and Sak, 2002: 139-140). 
The reason of collapse of 1999 program was accumulated structural distortions, which put 
pressure on the pegged exchange rate regime, and the failure of the Turkish government 
to maintain its austerity targets and to implement the necessary structural adjustment 
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reforms on time. This caused to first a liquidity crisis, which in turned precipitated a 
banking crisis and finally spread over the whole economy. The initial crisis started in 
November 2000 due to three factors. First; although during first half of 2000 the targets 
for net domestic assets and primary deficits were attained, and inflation fell substantially, 
it still remained 15 percentage points above the target, resulting in a considerable 
appreciation of the domestic currency in real terms. Hence disinflation, currency 
appreciation and exceptionally low (even negative) real interest rates combined to 
generate a strong domestic demand-led recovery. As a consequence trade deficit doubled 
causing the current-account deficit to rise to 5 percent of GDP, and global investors, 
whose risk perception increased, felt uncomfortable especially considering the low level 
of real interest rates (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003: 1555). Second; the government failed to 
generate a continuous flow of good news, instead, because of the intra-coalition 
opposition to privatization of state owned enterprises, loss of credibility regarding 
government policies occurred. At the same time, proposed regulatory reforms of the 
banking sector were postponed. These delays “increased the suspicion in the market that 
the program was about to end” (Ertuğrul and Selcuk, 2001: 25). Take-over of three more 
banks by the Deposit Insurance Funds and a criminal investigation into failed banks 
aggravated the situation. In addition, contagion effect of Argentina stress, problems 
regarding Turkey-EU relationships, and accustomed year-end profit realization drive 
enhanced the troubles (Turhan, 2001: 183-184). All of these developments strengthened 
the idea that there was a more serious problem than known in the banking sector and at 
least some additional banks were to be declared insolvent. The environment itself 
contributed to this uncertainty and created a severe polarization in the banking system 
between “solvent” and supposedly “insolvent” banks. When the “good” ones closed their 
credit lines to those, which had been heavily dependent to over-night funds, Interbank 
money market crashed (Turhan, 2001: 183; Özatay and Sak; 2002: 148-149). The banks 
having urgent need for liquidity, engaged in fire sales of government securities, causing 
interest rates to soar incredibly and international capital to fly out of the market. The 
result was a credit crunch, which deepened when the Central Bank could not at first inject 
liquidity into the financial system by its commitment to remain under limit for net 
domestic assets. However when the level of interest rates began to threaten the whole 
banking system, the Central Bank had to reverse this policy. This, in turn further damaged 
the credibility of the stabilization program, raised doubts about the stability of the 
exchange rate and provoked capital flight. The Central Bank lost 6 billion US dollar of its 
foreign exchange reserves in a few days (Ghoshal, 2006: 182-183). The capital outflow 
ended only when the IMF agreed to a new financial aid of 10.5 billion US dollar from the 
Supplemental Reserve Facility, and the government reaffirmed its commitment to the 
stabilization and disinflation program, to bank reform and privatization efforts. 
The panic reoccurred on the February 19, 2001, when the prime minister announced that 
there was a severe political crisis between the president and himself. This was perceived 
as a peril to the continuation of the stabilization program. Worries caused to both foreign 
investors and Turkish residents to buy foreign exchange and 5 billion US dollar 
withdrawn, while the central bank again hesitated to inject liquidity, interest rates soared. 
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The rate of one-month treasury bills jumped to 144 percent on February 20, while the 
overnight interest rate climbed to 6,200 percent as banks were starving for liquidity 
(Eichengreen, 2001: 5-6; Turhan, 2001:Akyüz and Boratav, 2003: 1556; Ghosal, 2006: 
184). The day after when the Turkish lira was left to float within a single day it 
depreciated against the dollar by 36 percent within two days. 
4. Transformation of Turkish Economy in the Aftermath of 2001 crisis 
2001 crisis was the worst ever of past-World War II period and deeply affected the 
country. The government called in Kemal Derviş, a former World Bank official, and 
appointed him as “super-minister of economy” on March 2nd. Derviş announced a 
strategy of exit from the crisis based on structural policies aimed at correcting the 
distortions caused to the crisis, and at enhancing the transparency of economic 
management and the role of the private sector in the economy. This strategy was adopting 
tight fiscal and monetary policies to restore financial stability and resume the disinflation 
process as a sine quo non (IMF, 2001). However the program needed the support of 
domestic and international market players and hence its approval by the IMF became a 
prerequisite. Turkey, when applied to IMF, was faced with a new approach that included 
the entire Fund’s assistance being conditioned with providing necessary legal framework 
and political system reforms in advance. 
In mid-April, “Transition to Strong Economy Program” was announced together with its 
measures and legal regulations. A detailed timing/sequencing plan has included legal 
regulations for re-structuring of financial sector, increasing the transparency and 
strengthening of public finance, and improving competitiveness and efficiency in 
economy by mainly removing old structures preventing effective functioning of market 
mechanism, e.g. discretionary pricing of publicly produced goods and services. These 
regulations were: Amendment to the Banking Act, the Central Bank Law, regulation on 
Closing of Extra-budgetary Funds, Expropriation Act, Telecom-Sugar-Tobacco-Natural 
Gas Laws and Law on Economic and Social Council (CBRT, 2001:3). Following a quick 
preparatory phase and introduction of majority of the listed regulations, a new letter of 
intent was signed and IMF approved augmentation of Turkey’s standby credit. Hence, an 
additional foreign financing of 15.7 billion US dollar was extended by the IMF and the 
World Bank for the May- December 2001 period. 
From late 2001 favorable results generated by measures, became noticeable. Inflation 
declined continually, the public debt to GDP ratio was significantly reduced and then 
inflation expectations began to follow a downward trend. The economy entered in a rapid 
recovery and, with 7.9 percent real growth rate registered in 2002, it took the second 
highest rank in major emerging market economies after China. Even though the 
stabilization program and the associated structural reforms restored monetary and fiscal 
discipline, for the debt ratio to decrease comfortable levels, a certain period of time was 
nevertheless required. In the meantime, still highly indebted economy was vulnerable to 
changes in market sentiment, in particular to concerns about debt sustainability (Özatay, 
2005: 276). 
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Market data supported this argument (See Appendix p.2). Both interest and foreign 
exchange rates fluctuated according to the news, highlighting the role of expectations that 
varied according to the sustainability of the public debt. Developments like suspect on 
political stability such as the hospitalization of the Prime Minister Ecevit, dispute among 
ministers and coalition leaders or increasing tension due to the Iraq war deteriorated 
market conditions, independent from the existing real macro fundamentals. On the other 
hand, news strengthening expectations about the debt sustainability, such as single party 
government or positive developments regarding the relationships with the EU led to 
lower interest rates and stronger Turkish lira. 
After the early elections on November 3rd 2002 due to continuous discord between 
coalition forming parties and Minister Derviş, a completely different political picture 
emerged. All three parties remained below the 10 percent threshold and hence could not 
enter into the parliament. In fact, the parliament had a dual composition with only AKP 
(Justice and Development Party), a 15 month-old new party in power and CHP, which 
had been out since last elections in 1999, in opposition. A replacement of this kind should 
be considered as exceptional for democratic systems. Actually, except for extraordinary 
conditions of military intervention periods, it was the first time since Turkey moved into 
multiparty democracy in 1946 that such a radical change has never occurred. This shift is 
important to show the magnitude and scope of transformation, which covers almost all 
spheres of the society, occurred in Turkey after the 2001 crisis. 
Turkey constitutes an apparent example of no long term trade-off between inflation and 
growth, especially when inflation is considerably high. In a five-year period covering 
2003 to 2007, public fiscal discipline was evidently restored, single digit inflation was 
reached, and yet growth rate was doubled compared to the previous decade average 
(Figure 1).  
As significant fiscal consolidation and debt reduction gained credibility thanks to above 6 
percent of GDP primary consolidated public sector surplus attained for all five successive 
years, this started to serve as a policy anchor. Consequently, Turkish economy, which 
was ranked as 28th biggest in the world, took the 16th as of 2007 according to World 
Bank data. 
4.1. Factors of Success 
The success of transformation depended on its main characteristics that also differentiated 
it from the previous failed attempts. Policies and measures which were put into practice 
aftermath of the 2001 crisis went beyond of conventional crisis management in the short 
term. Steps were taken to restructure the dynamics of the economy based on sustainable 
public finance, price stability, and private sector driven sustainable growth, to remove 
persistent distortions in the economy, and to restore a sound financial system. Hence three 
main factors of success are austere fiscal and monetary policies, rapid structural reforms, 
which are to be implemented without compromise, excuses or delays, and a 
comprehensive restructuring of once corrupted, inefficient and insolvent financial sector 
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that aims at bringing the banking practices more closely in line with the international 
standards.  
First, disciplined fiscal policy has been the cornerstone of the program, allowing 
declining debt ratios, facilitating disinflation, and reducing real interest rates (Figure 2). 
Fiscal consolidation achieved thanks to high primary surplus, and resulting reduction in 
interest rates have encouraged private capital formation, building the foundation of 
sustainable growth (Figure 1). 
Figure 2: Consolidated Public Sector Balancea, PSBRa and Interest Ratesb (%) 
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Public debt responded quickly to sound fiscal policies. Combined with economic 
recovery and high growth rates, this caused a drastic fall in debt to GDP ratio, which was 
elevated to more than 100 percent just after the crisis. In addition, decreasing public debt 
burden led to lower roll over ratios and risk perception of creditors ameliorated. While 
perceived riskiness of the Treasury was getting reduced, the risk premium associated to 
the public borrowing came down as well. Hence a virtuous cycle formed: primary surplus 
causing a decline in public borrowing requirement, which diminishes roll over ratios, 
resulting in significantly decreased interest rates that lessens public spending and hence 
alleviates further fiscal consolidation. 
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Second, the Central Bank was granted independence after a period of thirty years of high 
and chronic inflation and massive dollarization. The primary and main objective of the 
CBRT was determined as achieving and maintaining price stability by the amendment to 
the Central Bank Law. This constituted a turning point in the economy and highly 
contributed to the changing dynamics in the Turkish financial system. In addition, it was 
explicitly indicated in its law that financial stability was put into the Central Bank’s 
auxiliary objective.  
The vulnerable economy and the lack of credibility due to previous unsuccessful 
stabilizations and high degree of inflation inertia caused by both backward indexation and 
dollarization required a transparent monetary regime with a clear nominal anchor to shape 
inflation expectations. Many theoretical and empirical studies show the role of 
expectations in economic policy formation and superiority of rule based policies (only a 
few and well known examples Friedman, 1968; Lucas, 1972; Sargent, 1973; Barro, 1976; 
Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The choice of the exchange rate as nominal anchor was out 
of question because an ERBSP had just been abandoned in total loss of confidence. 
Monetary aggregates could not be an alternative either because of several reasons. First, 
while monetary targeting was necessitating two assumptions to hold. The velocity of the 
money is predictable and inflation is solely determined by money growth. however, it was 
almost not possible to predict money demand under a chronically high inflation 
environment. The final alternative was the choice of inflation itself as the nominal anchor 
and that refers to inflation targeting regime. The CBRT implemented this new regime 
implicitly under a floating exchange rate regime for the period 2002 to 2005 reflecting the 
fact that the preconditions such as strong fiscal position of the government and further 
stability in the financial markets were not yet fulfilled. Meantime, in February 2004, after 
34 years inflation fell to a single-digit level, and a currency reform of dropping six zeros 
from the Turkish lira was realized. Transitions from implicit to full-fledged inflation 
targeting in 2006, after a transition where inflation targets were undershoot for the whole 
period (which was a positive sign, since inflation was still too high) improved 
transparency and predictability and hence helped to decrease further the risk premium. 
Political stability and macroeconomic normalization put the Turkish economy on an 
above trend growth trajectory (Figure 1). GDP increased by 42 percent cumulatively from 
2002 to 2006 while seasonally adjusted annualized growth rate was 8.9 percent for the 
same period that brought Turkey seventh fastest growing economy of the world. 
Uncompromising fiscal consolidation and tight monetary policy mix did not only reduce 
inflation but also modified the composition of gross domestic product. Since prudent 
fiscal policies left very little room for government expenditures, private sector has been 
the engine of growth since 2002. Between 2001 and the second quarter of 2007, 
investment and consumption expenditures of the private sector rose by 146.8 percent and 
37.7 percent respectively in real terms. Since disinflation and currency stability have 
lowered both the actual and relative price of investment goods, this fall in the cost of 
capital encouraged firms to substitute more capital in the production process. Hence from 
2003, private investments became a determining component of the GDP, an element that 
has never seen for the last decades. 
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Another aspect of the Turkish transformation is the incomparable productivity increase 
mainly thanks to reduced inflation. Productivity gains have underpinned the economic 
growth and enhanced its quality and played a significant role in the strong growth 
performance. The contribution of total factor productivity to growth which was 3.3 
percent on average in the 1989-2001 period. rose to 42 percent in the 2001-2005 period 
(Saygılı, et al. 2002, CBRT). Surging productivity has created an encouraging 
macroeconomic configuration and provided a healthy ground for direct investment. Labor 
productivity in the manufacturing sector rose by 41 percent in the 2001-2007 period. 
Structural reforms and the acceleration of productivity growth have also raised Turkey’s 
potential growth rate which was about 4 percent to about 7 percent. In addition 
Productivity gains restrained aggregate domestic demand and augmented the output gap. 
Hence the economy could grow without causing inflationary pressures. 
The chronic macroeconomic instability had seriously distressed capital formation in the 
lost decade of the 1990s. Thanks to productivity improvement which contributed 
corporate profitability profit-maximizing firms’ expectations about future revenues led 
them to increase their investments. As capital to labor ratio is increasing following the 
mechanism mentioned above, the composition of manufacturing industry changed in 
favor of capital-intensive sectors. 
Export performance was astonishing over the transformation period. Since prudent fiscal 
policies left very little room for disposable income growth, firms had to look for export 
opportunities and increased productivity provided a competitive improvement relative to 
the past. As a result, exports as of 2007 more than tripled compared with 2001. The 
increase in labor productivity has lowered unit labor costs and facilitated export-driven 
economic expansion in spite of almost continuous appreciation of Turkish lira. Exports 
did not only rise significantly but also volatility of foreign trade was reduced compared to 
previous periods. This constitutes evidence that foreign exchange stability attained 
through the transformation was not detrimental for exports contrary as it is often believed.  
The accession process of Turkey to the EU was another anchor that provided support to 
the program. Even though there still exists many problems and it will take a considerable 
time for Turkey to become a full member of the EU. Yet the accession itself has already 
contributed to institutional change and structural reforms by both serving as a concrete 
target to attain and a benchmark to satisfy. In addition the EU membership target 
alleviates the acceptance of some reforms that would have been faced with keen 
resistance of social opposition. Institutional factors play a central role in determining a 
country’s rate of economic growth. There exists a large and fruitful literature on this issue 
suggesting that it is the incentive structure imbedded in the institutional structure of 
countries that should be the key in explaining the growth differentials (North, 1994; 
North, 2003). Indeed, institutional constraints that promote distortinary policies and 
worsen economic vulnerabilities account for a significant part of cross-country 
differences in economic growth and output volatility (Acemoglu et al. 2002). It is clear 
that sustainable growth and development depend on the existence of sound institutional 
arrangements. According to the neoclassical approach, just as competition working 
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through the market. institutions are conductive to growth evolve through “natural 
selection”. In fact, Turkish case shows that individuals and organizations with bargaining 
power, steaming from the existing institutional have crucial stakes in perpetuating the 
systems and hence impede institutional adjustments. Hence an external anchor such as the 
EU accession process actually helps by eliminating institutional inertia and reducing the 
cost of developing modern social configurations without a model. 
Another fortunate development was seen in the composition of foreign capital inflows. As 
a result of stabilization and accession process, investment climate in Turkey improved 
and  beginning from liberalization of foreign capital movements in late 1980s, for the first 
time the economy benefited from substantial amount of foreign direct investment and 
other long-term capital inflows.  
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) volume in the last five years reached to USD 75 billion 
while number of transactions was more than 650. Foreign investors’ transactions 
constituted more than 70% of the last three years’ volume and 80% of the last two years’ 
volume. Volume of transactions by private equity firms reached to USD 6.5 billion in the 
last three years. Popular sectors have been financial services (more than 85 deals) energy 
(around 50 deals) and food and beverage (more than 50 deals). Number of deals in 2007 
was 162 whereas the total volume was USD 20.6 billion. 
4.2. Costs of Virtue 
Turkey’s astonishing economic boom has been disappointing in terms of job creation. 
The extraordinary increase in real GDP reaching over 50 percent in the last six years was 
not enough to close the gap left by the deepest recession in history. Unemployment rate 
has been fluctuating around 10 percent, which is very high in every measure. The 
unusually prolonged period without sufficient job creation has caused a large number of 
young and mostly female workers to abstain from actively looking for work, and 
therefore to be excluded from the official unemployment measurement. When the fact 
that actual unemployment statistics fails to account such a “missing” labor force, the 
situation becomes more threatening. The reason of such a high unemployment is 
paradoxically the beneficial transformation in the economy. 
Macro stability and greater global integration brought benefits to the Turkish economy 
and contributed to rising standards of living. However structural adjustments have 
inevitably necessitated that factors of production, including labor resources, has shifted 
from shrinking sectors to expanding businesses, which has been a costly and painful 
process for the workers whose skills have no longer been in demand. The agriculture 
sector, which was accounting for one third of the labor force, but only one eighth of GDP 
has been undergoing such a comprehensive restructuring. In order to achieve fiscal 
consolidation, farming subsidies, which used to play an important role in maintaining low 
productivity family farms and curbing rural-urban migration were cut. In turn, the 
reduction in agricultural subsidies has increased rural unemployment and triggered a 
transfer of surplus labor from rural to urban areas. Similarly the rule to replace no more 
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than 50 percent of civil servants leaving through attrition and 10 percent of employees 
leaving state economic enterprises have led to a significant employment reduction in the 
public sector. Privatization and outsourcing efforts contributed to this downsizing further. 
Similarly, as the composition of manufacturing industry sifted towards a more capital-
intensive structure and as productivity became an indispensable element for success, 
some the excess capacity sectors e.g. textile and clothing, whose labor absorption 
capacity was relatively high have lost their position. The competition arising from the 
global integration worsened the situation. As a result, not only the economy faced with a 
jobless growth, but also in such a prosperous period, Turkey could not improve its 
income inequality problem. 
Firms, which had been operating under a high chronic inflation environment lost 
sensibility for productivity and adapted themselves according to unstable economic 
conditions. They developed a business model assuring their survival: lengthen the 
average turnover of payments, shorten the average turnover of receivables, and invest the 
residual into inventories. In addition even non-financial corporations became highly 
involved in foreign exchange and interest arbitrage. This business model was covering 
inefficiencies and leading to build excess capacities. As disinflation crystallized, 
economies of scales and cost efficiency became key factors to business success. However 
many firms, especially small and medium sized ones have found themselves in a very 
difficult situation since they were unable to reorient according to the new rules of the 
game. On the other hand, stabilization was increasing global integration as well, and this 
off course was heightening burden over again the same firms through the competition. 
With already diminished margins, traditional businesses neither could cope with global 
pressures nor could they find enough extra resources to invest for reformation of their 
firm. 
Although floating exchange rate regime was supposed to make necessary adjustment in 
balance of payments, real appreciation of domestic currency mainly due to increasing 
amount of foreign capital inflows attracted by the stabilization, deterioration of trade 
balance could not be prevented. There are several secular reasons for this deterioration, 
including substantial oil price hikes, which increased energy bill and very rapidly 
elevating commodity prices in global markets. Nevertheless, the stabilization program 
itself included a series of dilemma that worsened the situation. The combination of tight 
monetary policy and fiscal austerity offered significant rate of return while risk 
perception was reducing. During previous decades, borrowing for longer maturities was 
out of question. As stabilization was restored, and financial sector regained the function 
of intermediation, and volume of the loans to the real sector started to rise. Similarly, 
consumer loans, which were previously at very low levels compared with the 
international figures, rose drastically. 
While foreign capital inflows were abundant, firms and households exploited this new 
opportunity to finance investment and consumption expenditures. Although interest rates 
were relatively reduced, the Central Bank, whose main concern was the price stability, 
could not decrease interest rates further to limit capital inflows. As a consequence, on the 
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one hand amount of loanable funds were rising and on the other hand excess supply of 
foreign exchange were creating an upward pressure on the value of Turkish lira against 
foreign currencies. Appreciation of Turkish lira in turn, was enlarging interest arbitrage 
opportunities to foreign investors and hence attracted more capital. This cycle in 
stimulating import demand, has caused private indebtedness to increase. Turkey has 
become “trapped by success” as this “virtuous cycle” has made balance of payments 
vulnerable for sudden stops. 
5. Conclusion 
Turkish economy has lived through three and a half decades of high and volatile chronic 
inflation, high degree of currency substitution, and low and unstable growth rates. Living 
with such weaknesses for such a long period of time has created a strong inertia in 
inflation dynamics, deteriorated financial system and caused to misallocations and 
misalignments. Previous attempts to reform the economy were lacking of two 
indispensable principles: providing public sector discipline and building a transparent and 
accountable institutional governance framework. Furthermore the celerity and agility 
needed for success of reforms could not have been attained. Hence although reforms 
started with ambitious targets, every failure left a negative mark in the collective memory 
of the Turkish society. 
The stabilization program implemented in the aftermath of 2001 crisis included these 
principles and was brought into life very rapidly due to the urgency of the situation. All 
economic indicators show that the period after 2001 is structurally and significantly 
different compared with the previous decades. Productivity driven growth, the measure of 
fiscal consolidation, relative improvement in disinflation, changing composition of 
economic activity and integration of Turkish economy to the global markets should be 
considered as benchmarks of this successful transformation. However, the success is not 
costless. Economic units, which have taken positions according to the parameters of old 
economic construction, are facing difficulties. Especially traditional businesses, small and 
medium size enterprises, and agriculture have been suffering from the adjustment. In 
addition, real appreciation of domestic currency and increasing private indebtedness 
caused by the success of stabilization paradoxically generate vulnerability for sudden 
stops. Nevertheless compared with the costs of instability, those are negligible and 
Turkish case provides evidence in favor of disinflation programs combined with sound 
fiscal policies in spite of some adverse effects in the short run. 
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